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Post-Secularity and Urban Theology  
  
Abstract  
The secularisation thesis insisted that religion would gradually fade from human 
consciousness, but this has not happened. Given the persistence of faith, has the dawning 
of the twenty-first century heralded a new, post-secular settlement between secularists and 
people of faith? Academic analyses of post-secularism are often disengaged from the lives 
of diverse urban communities where faith remains a vibrant part of the landscape. A deeper 
engagement with the ways in which faith still plays an important role in meaning-making in 
urban communities can foster more holistic approaches to post-secularity. Drawing on case 
studies relating to urban youth exclusion and faith-based community organizing, this essay 
considers the impact that such a conversation has on the ways in which socially excluded 
communities articulate their sense of identity and on the development of a culturally credible 
model of urban liberation theology alongside communities who are still waiting for the ‘post’.  
  
Introduction  
The onward march of rationalism has not led to the death of religion. While it may have 
changed and, in some parts of the Global ‘North’, the number of people self-defining as non-
religious continues to increase, faith remains a central element in many local communities 
and a key player in civil society politics.1 The old secularist orthodoxy is increasingly under 
fire as a new post-secular social contract is hammered out. In this essay, I consider the 
impact that post-secular discourse has had on theology. Shaped by a liberative approach to 
theological reflection, I will suggest that academic debates about post-secularity largely fail 
to reflect the dynamic diversity of the contemporary city and do not engage with the multiple 
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struggles for social justice that characterise an urban landscape in the grip of an ongoing 
‘age of austerity’ and the resurgent xenophobia that has accompanied the election of Donald 
Trump as US President and the Brexit phenomenon in the UK. I will argue that debates 
about post-secularity need to be people-centred rather than process-driven if they are to 
foster a social ethic of mutuality capable of resourcing a culturally credible, urban theology 
of liberation.   
  
The Rise and fall of secularism  
The work of Max Weber defined social scientific debate about the public role of religion for 
most of the twentieth century. Weber (1930) argued that as societies modernise religion 
would become less publicly important as people increasingly turned to science to answer 
life’s big questions. Following its high water-mark in the work of Wilson (1966) and Berger  
(1967), support for Weber’s secularisation thesis began to wane. Sociologists like Bruce 
(2002: 2011) still affirm Weber’s hypothesis that the public decline of religion is the inevitable 
consequence of the differentiation of the world into public and private spheres, which 
emerged from the religious rationalism of the Protestant Reformation (Walsham, 2008: 499) 
but his is now a minority view.  Berger (1967: 107-8) argued that although religion would 
continue to comfort some people in an unfriendly world, institutional secularisation would 
ultimately be accompanied by a similar shift in consciousness. Just before the turn of the 
century, however, Berger (1997: 994) suggested that he, like many other sociologists of 
religion, had been mistaken because, ‘Most of the world today is certainly not secular. It’s 
very religious.’ Writing a few years earlier Davie (1990: 1994) contended that, while church 
membership had declined significantly in the post-war era, this did not necessarily mean that 
people had swapped faith for secularism. Her (2016) subsequent work, like that of Lynch 
(2002: 2007) and Partridge (2002; 2004) invites us to be wary of such a simplistic 
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assumption. Early in the twenty-first century, Woodhead and Heelas (2005) explored the 
changing face of faith in the town of Kendal in the North of England, suggesting we are at a 
watershed moment in the history of religion in Europe. Heelas and Woodhead (2005: 3-4) 
spoke of a subjective turn towards individualised forms of spirituality - ‘The goal is…to have 
the courage to become one’s own authority…to forge one’s own inner-directed…life’. 
Partridge (2002: 240) argues that the disenchantment to which Weber points paved the way 
for a resurgent interest in ‘alternative spiritualities’ in Europe and North America. For 
Partridge (2002, 241), however, ‘…Secularisation theorists are too wedded to their grand 
metanarrative of a linear, irreversible…decline [in] organised religion…to recognise the 
importance of new forms of spirituality.’   
Lynch (2002) discusses the experience of ‘Generation X’ - a loose term used to 
designate a rejection of institutional religion and consequent search for individualised 
existential meaning.2 For Lynch (2002: 27) Generation X was born as, ‘religious and social 
certainties began to dissolve and become more fluid.’ In this context, argued Lynch (2002: 
31), ‘meaning is not something that can be found in pre-packaged forms…but…has to be 
sought in a personal way.’ Lynch (2007), like Partridge examines the re-contextualisation of 
ancient earth-centred spiritualities and aspects of Buddhist philosophy and Jewish and Sufi 
mysticism by largely left-of-centre members of Generation X who are equally unpersuaded 
by organised religion and secularism.  
Building on her earlier work Davie (2016, 162) argues that while Weber forwarded 
his analysis of religion in the midst of a rapidly changing Europe, these contextual concerns 
‘turned into theoretical assumptions, with the strong, but unsubstantiated, implication that 
secularisation would necessarily accompany modernization whenever and wherever it 
occurred.’ For Davie (2016: 163) the growing critique of the secularisation thesis, ‘amounts 
to nothing less than a paradigm shift’ within sociology. This new academic climate emerged 
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as theorists sought to keep pace with a changed social context within which faith 
communities have assumed an increased ‘significance as markers of identity’ (Davie, 
2016: 172) as religious faith has become de-privatised (Casanova, 1994: 211ff).   
Two further factors have challenged secularist assumptions that faith should be 
excluded from the public sphere. First, the growth of the British-Muslim community has 
impacted on debates and policy formation in relation to social cohesion and civic action 
(O’Toole et al 2015). Second, migration from West Africa has led to the rapid growth of 
new, often Pentecostal, Christian denominations (Burgess: 2009). Davie (2016: 175) 
summarises, ‘Religion continues to influence almost every aspect human society – 
economic, political, social and cultural.’ The secular orthodoxy, which excluded religion 
from the public sphere is has lost its credibility as faith groups have continued to be 
important players in civil society politics, locally, nationally and internationally (Dinham, 
2009: 2012).   
  
Looking for a new consensus  
The work of Jürgen Habermas has had a major influence on the emergence of postsecular 
discourse. Habermas (1991: 130) argues that we need to move beyond a secular-religious 
binary if we are to understand how religion can, ‘help us express our best moral intuitions’.  
He (2006: 10) suggests that, ‘Religious traditions have a special power to articulate [these] 
moral intuitions, especially with regard to vulnerable forms of communal life’ and points out 
that, ‘religious organizations are increasingly assuming the role of “communities of 
interpretation” in the public arena of secular societies’ (2008: 20). Ironically, however, 
Habermas (2006: 4) echoes the influential but widely contested (Shannahan, 2017) ‘clash 
of civilisations’ thesis popularised by Huntington (1993), implying that religious diversity 
threatens social cohesion. Furthermore, like Castells (2010), Habermas (2006: 1-3; 2008: 
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18-19) seemingly equates the influence of religion almost exclusively with conservative 
social movements, rather than with progressive networks like Drop the Debt, Stop the War, 
or Sojourners.   
  Sketching out the postsecular landscape, Habermas (2006: 5ff) suggests that, ‘For 
all their ongoing dissent on…world views and religious doctrines, citizens are meant to 
respect one another as free and equal members of their political community.’ However, he 
still appears to suggest that the needs and perceptions of a secular state and citizens who 
are people of faith are in conflict. Habermas (2006: 7) acknowledges that a new social 
contract should not expect faith communities to translate every religious statement into ‘a 
universally accessible language’ (2006: 8), while also asserting that, ‘Given that in the liberal 
state only secular reasons count, citizens who adhere to a faith are obliged to establish a 
kind of ‘balance’ between their religious and their secular convictions.’ Habermas (2006: 9) 
is concerned that the separation of religion and politics in the public sphere does not cause 
‘an undue mental and psychological burden for those citizens who follow a faith’ but insists 
that people of faith must acknowledge the, ‘priority that secular reasons enjoy in the political 
arena.’ For Habermas, it seems, the public sphere should be shaped around secularist 
principles, which casts doubt on whether post-secularity reflects an existential shift or a 
pragmatic example of realpolitik.    
  
 Postsecularity and theology    
The postsecular turn in theology coincided with a resurgent interest in what Hoelzl and  
Ward (2008) called the ‘new visibility of religion’ in civil society politics (Scott et al, 2009; 
Baker, 2007; Bretherton, 2011; 2014 and Shannahan, 2014). What impact has postsecular 
discourse had on theological discussions about the political role of faith groups on an 
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increasingly fluid cultural landscape? A brief look at the ‘Radical Orthodoxy’ movement and 
recent developments in public theology can help us to respond to this question.  
    The memorable, ‘Once there was no secular’ with which John Milbank (1990: 9) began 
Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, served as a pithy preface to the 
emergence of the Radical Orthodoxy movement almost a decade later. The publication of 
Radical Orthodoxy: A new theology (Milbank et al, 1999) was the academic equivalent of 
hurling a rock into a pool. Almost twenty years later the ripples are still disturbing theological 
waters. Milbank et al (1999: 1) nailed their colours to the mast in the first paragraph, ‘For 
several centuries now, secularism has been…constructing…a world in which the theological 
is either discredited or turned into a harmless leisure-time activity…And yet…today the logic 
of secularism is imploding.’ Radical Orthodoxy is a postmodern bricolage, mingling, 
‘exegesis, cultural reflection and philosophy in a complex…collage’ (Milbank et al, 1999: 2) 
but is deeply critical of modernity and the Enlightenment secularism that followed in its wake. 
This postsecular theological movement seeks, ‘a return to patristic and medieval roots’ 
because for Milbank et al the ‘fragments’ (1999: 23-24) of pre-secular Augustinian orthodoxy 
can challenge rationalist secularism.   
Radical Orthodoxy captured the imagination but struggles to speak in a dialogical 
manner to a postsecular age. As Doak (2007: 372) notes, ‘Milbank challenges Christian 
theology to recover its proper position as the master discourse that positions all other 
discourses.’ Shakespeare (2000: 167) argues that Radical Orthodoxy, ‘seems incapable of 
admitting any good whatever in secular or non-Christian discourses’, thereby (2000: 168) 
fostering an, ‘endless conflict between mutually exclusive discourses all seeking to occupy 
the hermeneutical high ground.’ For many, it is Milbank’s name that is most publicly 
connected with Radical Orthodoxy, but it is the less acerbic work of his compatriot Ward that 
brings the movement’s broad themes into a sharper dialogue with the particularities of the 
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modern city. Contemporary urban theologians would benefit from reflection on Ward’s 
contention (2000: 36ff) that in the face of the, ‘rise of market-driven consumerism, cities 
become increasingly secular places…’ and that, as a result, ‘faith becomes increasingly 
privatised.’ Ward’s conflation of consumerism and secularisation is overly generalised and 
his insistence that faith is inevitably confined to the private sphere fails to reflect the dynamic 
diversity of the 21st century city. However, his wrestling with the specificity of urban life 
presents Radical Orthodoxy in a more provisional light than the vision articulated by Milbank. 
Ward’s (2000: 55ff) reflections on de-industrialisation and his apparent movement beyond 
Christian exclusivism could stimulate a creative dialogue between Radical Orthodoxy 
advocates and urban theologians who are critical of the movement. However, it is unclear 
how the concerns of Radical Orthodoxy engage with life in an ‘age of austerity’ or grassroots 
interfaith dialogue in superdiverse but splintered cities where the movement’s grand themes 
fail to resonate.  
  A second theological response to postsecular discourse is found in public theology, 
the contemporary cousin of the older discipline of political theology and in debates about the 
nature of theology and its place in the public sphere. Although many commentators dismiss 
him as a Nazi apologist, the first use of the term ‘political theology’ is found in the work of 
Carl Schmitt (1922/1985). However, political theology finds its roots not in Nazi Germany 
but in the writings of the Hebrew Prophets and the description of Jesus’ ministry in the 
Gospels. In an academic context we can date the birth of the political theology to the work 
of three German theologians – Johann Baptist Metz (1969), Dorothy Sölle (1974) and Jürgen 
Moltmann (1967; 1974); the first generation of Latin American liberation theologians – 
Gustavo Gutiérrez (1974), Leonardo Boff (1978) and Juan Luis Segundo (1975) and to the 
pioneer of US black theology, James Cone (1969). While liberation theology, black theology 
and urban theology are contextual theologies that engage in depth with lived experience, 
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much political theology has confined itself to debates about macro issues, a critical dialogue 
with political philosophy and a theological critique of institutionalised political and economic 
power (Scott and Cavanaugh, 2004: 2; Stackhouse, 2004: 282).  
A fixed distinction between political theology and public theology is misleading 
because both disciplines explore the theological implications of faith-based engagement in 
the public sphere. However, the rise of public theology has signalled a theological shift from 
institutions and structures to networks and neighbourhoods, state to civil society and a 
secular landscape to an uncertain postsecular settlement. Martin Marty (1974: 332-59) was 
probably the first to use the term ‘public theology’, which Stackhouse (2004: 284ff) suggests 
was quickly adopted for three reasons. First, it symbolised a shift to a broader understanding 
of the public sphere and faith-based civil society politics. Second, the term resonated with 
attempts to find a credible way of talking about faith in an increasingly secularised and 
diverse public sphere. Third, as Stackhouse (2004: 284) notes, it echoed an older Social 
Gospel tradition, which emphasised, ‘...the responsibility of the ecclesial community to 
engage in [the]…constant reformation of the social order.’  
  Public theology seeks to articulate a theology for a post-secular age.3 Its’ focus on 
individuals and local communities puts it in a better position than political theology or Radical 
Orthodoxy to provide a theological voice capable of engaging dialogically with the central 
players in an increasingly fluid public sphere – government, economic structures and civil 
society. However, while the Global Network for Public Theology now includes researchers 
in Nigeria, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil and Tonga, Cady (2014: 292-3) 
suggests that public theology has, to date, been largely confined to theologians in the US, 
Europe, Australia and South Africa.4 In an interwoven world does the implicit dominance of 
the Global ‘North’ and an enduring link to the Church limit the capacity of public theology to 
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engage with the existential concerns of communities in the Global ‘South’ or hinder its 
development in inherently multifaith communities?   
  The work of Elaine Graham exemplifies public theology’s attempt to respond to the 
postsecular shift in academic discourse. Graham has sought to articulate a culturally credible 
postsecular Christian apologetics. She (2013: xiii) suggests that, ‘the world appears to 
be…entering an unprecedented political and cultural era’ in which the separation of religion 
and politics that was a central plank of Modernity is becoming increasingly anachronistic. 
However, while Graham (2013: xvi) notes that secularisation is not, ‘uniform, inevitable or 
irreversible’ she suggests that we are not witnessing a religious revival or a, ‘return to 
Western Christendom.’ For Graham (2013: xvi) public theology represents, ‘a quest for a 
new voice in…a public debate that is more fragmented, more global and more disparate’ 
than anything we have known before.  Graham (2013: xx) argues that public theology 
revolves around two fundamental concerns. First, ‘it privileges…the societal meanings of 
faith in contrast to forms of religious belief and practice that confine faith to private and pietist 
intentions.’ Second, she (2013: xx) contends that public theology is, ‘less concerned with 
defending the interests of specific faith communities than generating informed 
understandings of the theological and religious dimensions of public issues’. This may be 
true, but public theology continues to frame its discourse within a Christian worldview. It is 
therefore reasonable to ask whether the discipline can credibly engage with the search for 
meaning in the multifaith cities of the twenty-first century within which an increasing majority 
of people have no connection whatsoever with the institutional church.  
  The emergence of public theology exemplifies the need for Christian theologians in a 
postsecular age to re-think old debates about the relationship between Christianity and 
culture, which find their roots in Richard Niebuhr’s (1951) Christ and Culture. Niebuhr’s ideal 
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types continue to raise questions about the role of faith in civil society politics and the 
relationship between theology and culture. Graham (2016: 25), however, argues that the  
Church needs to recover an ‘apologetics of presence’, not ‘as a weapon of conversion, but 
a gesture of solidarity and reconciliation.’5 Influenced by its Christian Realist roots, public 
theology is better placed to resource the development of an inclusive postsecular theological 
narrative than Radical Orthodoxy. However, its broad-brush approach, implicit linkage to the 
institutional Church and insufficiently developed dialogue with the social sciences cast doubt 
on its ability to articulate the everyday realities and existential questions of the millions for 
whom the ‘age of austerity’ has become a seemingly unending fact of life.      
  
Bursting the post-secular bubble  
Debates about post-secularism arguably reflect the existential questioning of a small 
metropolitan intellectual élite, rather than the concerns of most city-dwellers. For many 
people religion has never played any discernible role in their lives. Stark (1999: 255ff) and 
Swatos and Christiano (1999: 200-221) suggest that debates about secularisation and post-
secularity are premised on a misreading of history, which imagines the past as a religious 
‘golden age’. For some city-dwellers, faith is a submerged part of their cultural hinterland 
that surfaces during times of communal or personal crisis (Reddie, 2001 and Wilkinson, 
1993). For others, faith continues to act as an affirming identity marker in a society that 
demonises them (Modood and Ahmad, 2007: 187-213). And for other people talk of the ‘new 
visibility of religion’ is mistaken. Faith never went away but has undergirded progressive 
social movements for more than a century and remains the basis of their political 
engagement (Shannahan, 2014).   
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I have summarised the growing critique of the secularisation thesis and the emergence 
of theological responses to post-secularism and suggested that they fail to meet the needs 
of socially excluded communities. I want now to ask some awkward questions of post-
secularism’s cheer-leaders by drawing on two case studies that burst the post-secular 
bubble.  
  
Social Exclusion and Urban Youth Spiritualities  
From 2009-2012 I spent most of my time working alongside socially excluded urban youth 
on a large housing estate in the city of Birmingham in the UK. This ethnographic project 
explored how the experience of social exclusion impacted on the ways in which unemployed 
young men thought and spoke about identity, community and spirituality. At the time, the 
estate was amongst the 5% most multiply deprived communities in England and Wales.6 
Five years later it remains the most multiply deprived Parliamentary constituency in 
Birmingham and amongst the 10% most deprived in England and Wales. Three things 
became clear during fieldwork. First, the dominant public discourse surrounding unemployed 
young men stigmatised them and robbed them of their agency. Second, none of the young 
men had any connection with organised faith groups, which were viewed as hypocrites who 
talked about social justice but did little about it. Third, academic analyses of ‘belief’ did not 
capture the contextualised nature of their existential questioning (Shannahan, 2012: 320-
322).   
At first glance, it might appear as if these young men were signed-up secularists, but 
first impressions can be misleading. Their lives disrupt neat arguments about the 
secular<>post-secular spectrum, raising questions about its usefulness in socially excluded 
urban communities. Debates about the decline of religion, its new visibility in civil society 
politics or the emergence of a post-secular co-existence between secularists and people of 
Accepted copy  
12  
  
faith did not resonate with young men in Bromford. Their rejection of religion was of 
peripheral importance because Church had never been a part of their lives anyway. 
However, their critique of the Church should not be equated with a rejection of the possibility 
of God as the words of one 19-year-old make clear, ‘I believe in God, but He doesn’t live 
round here!’ (Shannahan, 2012: 322).   
A generation ago, Tricia Rose (1994: 21) argued that, ‘Hip-Hop emerges from the 
deindustrialisation meltdown where social alienation, prophetic imagination and yearning 
intersect.’ Hip-Hop provides young men from Bromford with the vocabulary to articulate their 
own hopes, dreams and fears. It seemed natural, therefore, to work with the Birmingham 
graffiti artist, Mohammed Ali, to find a way in which the young men could give voice to their 
hopes and dreams. Together we created a huge graffiti cube entitled, ‘Bromford Dreams’.7   
As the young men created the cube, they made it clear that they wanted to include two 
figures in prayer - one Muslim and one Christian – for two reasons. First, because, as they 
said, ‘Everyone prays sometimes’ and second, as a slap in the face of the far-right English 
Defence League that had begun organising on the estate. Rap music enabled the young 
men to articulate their own individualised spirituality, which revolved around a contextualised 
Holy Trinity: Jesus, rap musician Tupac Shakur and Malcolm X. These iconic figures were 
not seen in dogmatic terms but as heroes standing in solidarity with the marginalised. Truth 
was not validated by outsiders but in relation to its capacity to embody an ethic of hope and 
agency in the face of social exclusion. Academic debates about secularisation, post-
secularity and ‘belief’ fail to capture the raw spirituality of the young men I got to know. They 
do not fit into the neat sociological or theological categories that have been created in other 
places and by other people. Theirs is a non-dogmatic spirituality of immanence and 
solidarity. It provides us with a window onto the complexity of meaning-making for young 
men for whom the debates of academics have no significance whatsoever.   




Community organising and faith-based politics  
Community organising was born in South Chicago just before the outbreak of the Second 
World War through the work of Saul Alinsky. Influenced by his Chicago Area Project, which 
supported young people caught up in gang violence, Alinsky spearheaded the development 
of the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council, which first met in July 1939. The success 
of its first assembly enabled Alinsky to establish the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) the 
following year. Other, explicitly faith-based community organisations like the Gamaliel 
Foundation and the PICO National Network followed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Such 
organisations premised their campaigning on a Biblical commitment to social justice rather 
than Alinsky’s more utilitarian approach. The Gamaliel Foundation makes this distinction 
explicit in its mission statement,   
  
Gamaliel’s organizing…draws on struggles for justice by people of faith stretching back 
thousands of years…Our work draws on…Christ’s life and teaching, the Torah, the 
Qur’an, Catholic social teaching, the founding principles of American democracy and 
the US civil rights movement.8  
  
However, it is the model of community organising created by Alinsky and developed by the  
IAF that took root, in an adapted form, in the UK in the early 1990s with the creation of the 
Citizens Organising Foundation (re-named Citizens UK in 2009). Bretherton (2014: 34) 
suggests that Alinsky sought to develop a ‘common life politics’, rather than a model of 
activism, revolving around the specifics of class or ethnicity. Bretherton (2014: 28-35) notes 
that Alinsky’s model of community organising was shaped by a commitment to networked 
bottom-up work, the emphasis within the US Labour Movement on mutuality and cooperation 
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and common good thinking within Catholic Social Teaching. The work of the IAF during 
Alinsky’s lifetime was characterised by a pragmatic rather than a principled engagement with 
faith groups (Shannahan, 2014: 25ff). However, since Alinsky’s death in 1972 the IAF has 
placed a stronger emphasis on the animating force of Jewish and Christian spirituality 
(Chambers and Cowan, 2003 and Bretherton, 2014: 41ff).9   
The community organising model that took root in the USA and was to catapult former 
organiser Barack Obama into the White House in 2009 crossed the Atlantic at the end of the 
Thatcher decade (Bretherton, 2014: 76ff; Shannahan, 2014: 33ff). Influenced by his 
engagement with US organising, Neil Jameson established The East London Citizens 
Organisation and the Citizens Organisation Foundation/Citizens UK, which by 2017 involved 
more than 24,000 people from over 300 civil society organisations. Although not explicitly 
faith-based Citizens UK relies heavily on the support of churches, mosques, gurdwaras and 
synagogues, bridging the gap between the model adopted by the IAF and that exemplified 
by the Gamaliel Foundation in the USA.10 Bretherton (2014: 76) describes community 
organising in the UK as a practice that, ‘mediates the relationship between ‘faith’ and 
democratic citizenship’ and both Shannahan (2014: 9) and Bretherton (2014: 77) argue that 
it draws on a centuries-long heritage of socially progressive faith-based activism.  
A generation ago, the urban theologian Kenneth Leech (1997: 140) anticipated the 
ecclesiological implications of post-secular theological discourse, suggesting that the calling 
of the Church was to be, ‘a creative minority within society’, rather than the dominant voice 
seemingly imagined by advocates of Radical Orthodoxy. A framing of the ‘new visibility of 
religion’ in civil society politics within Leech’s agitating minority ethic could animate the post-
secular witness that public theologians are searching for. Post-secular discourse has been 
articulated within an academic sub-culture. However, its carefully honed analysis is 
disrupted by the particularities and gritty political activism of community organising. Fusing 
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Qur’anic and Biblical commitments to equality and human worth with the comparable values 
of trades’ unionists, community groups and students’ unions, community organising side-
steps disengaged debates about secularism and post-secularity. Its ‘re-weaving of the fabric 
of society’ bursts the secular/post-secular bubble, focusing instead on building broad-based 
campaigns that put food on the table and a roof over someone’s head.     
  
Conclusion  
As the world becomes an increasingly urban planet, it is becoming clear that the future of 
faith will probably be decided in large cities. In this essay, I have suggested that debates 
about secularisation, re-enchantment and post-secularity fail to engage with the complex 
realities of urban life. The secular/post-secular narrative does not reflect the more nuanced 
discourse in diverse urban communities where faith continues to be an important, if 
sometimes submerged, feature of life or where it never made much of an impact in the first 
place. Life in the twenty-first century city is not reducible to a neat secular/post-secular 
either-or but is characterised by fluidity and change. It is in this liminal ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 
1994) that new meanings and identities are forged as Beaumont and Baker (2011: 3) 
recognise in their exploration of the ‘flows of interaction between diverse groups’ in the 
contemporary city. Disengagement from organised religion in socially excluded urban 
communities does not neatly equate with secularism on the one hand or re-enchantment on 
the other but can give rise to new hip-hop infused spiritualities of solidarity and resistance. 
The resurgent visibility of religion within civil society politics need not reduce faith groups to 
welfare delivery agencies in a post-secular ‘age of austerity’ but can give stimulate bottom-
up models of prophetic faith-based activism that speak truth to power. It is to this agenda 
that urban theology must turn as the twenty-first century draws to the end of its second 
decade.  
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 Notes  
1. Web sites – In 2014 22% of people in the USA self-defined as non-religious. See 
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/. In 2017 in the UK the British Social Attitudes 
survey indicated that 53% of people described themselves as non-religious. See 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/04/half-uk-population-has-no-religion-british-
socialattitudes-survey   
2. The popularising of the term ‘Generation X’ is often attributed to the novelist Douglas 
Coupland and his 1992 novel Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture. London.  
3. Web site - http://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/ accessed 17 September 2017. The work of the 
Theos think-tank exemplifies the broad-based approach of public theology in the 21st century.  
4. Web site - http://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/ accessed 17 September 2017. The work of the 
Theos think-tank exemplifies the broad-based approach of public theology in the 21st century. 5. Web 
site - https://chestercathedral.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/A-New-ApologeticsCathedral.pdf 
accessed 17 September 2017.  
6. Web site file:///C:/Users/ac0971/Downloads/Index_of_Deprivation_2015.pdf accessed 25 
September 2017.  
7. Both photographs taken by the author, March 2012.  
8. Web site - http://www.gamaliel.org/AboutUs/History.aspx accessed 29 September 2017.  
9. Web site - http://www.industrialareasfoundation.org/content/mission accessed 29 September 
2017.  
10. Web site - http://www.citizensuk.org/ accessed 29 September 2017.  
  
  
Further reading  
• Shannahan, C (2010) Voices from the Borderland: Cross-cultural Urban 
Liberation Theology in the Twenty-First Century. London: Equinox – This 
monograph introduces the reader to the world of urban theology, providing the first 
critical analysis to the discipline and raising key questions about the changing nature 
of spirituality and theologies of liberation.  
• Woodhead, L and Catto, R. (2012), Ed. Religion and Change in Modern Britain. 
Abingdon: Routledge. – This multidisciplinary edited volume charts the changing 
and increasingly fluid nature of religion in the UK and enables the reader to wrestle 
with a turn away from secularism towards more provisional post-secularist analyses 
of the search for meaning in the 21st century.  
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